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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ZEBLEN v. WHITE, et al., 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
vs. 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH 
CARE, INC., et al., 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16266 
This is an action by Zeblen V. White, an incompetent, 
by and through his guardian ad litem and natural daughter, 
Dorene Zundel, for damages for personal injuries suffered 
as a result of the medical malpractice of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court below granted a Judgment of Dismissal and 
Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendants-Respondents. The 
judgments were based upon the lower court's finding that 
Plaintiff-Appellant's claim and cause of action were barred 
by the statute of limitations. (R. 86,87) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to vacate the judgments 
granted by the Court below and have this action remanded for 
trial on the merits. 
STATEViENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Zeblen V. White is an incompetent residing 
in Box Elder County, State of Utah, and appears in this action 
through his duly appointed guardian ad litem, Dorene Zundel, 
his natural daughter. (R. 9-13) Defendants, Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc. and The Health Services Corporation of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints are corporations 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, 
and at all times material hereto said Defendants were the 
owners of and engaged in managing and operating the McKay-Dee 
Hospital, hereinafter referred to as the "Hospital", in Ogden, 
Utah, for the care and treatment of patients. The Defendant, 
Dr. Peter s. Quintero was at all times material hereto a 
physician licensed to practice and practicing medicine in the 
State of Utah. (R. 2, 3, 15, 16 and 26) 
On April 15, 1975, Plaintiff was admitted to the 
Hospital for medical care and treatment. On or about the 
18th day of April, 1975, and thereafter, while Plaintiff was 
confined in said Hospital as a patient and under the treatment 
and care of said Defendants, Plaintiff sustained injuries and 
-2-
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damages which were proximately caused by the negligent acts 
and omissions of the Defendants. (R. 305) Plaintiff further 
claims that he did not give his informed consent to the par-
ticular procedures recommended by the Defendants and would 
not have consented had the dangers and hazards thereof been 
made known to him. (R. 5, 6) 
On the 18th day of April, 1977, an action was filed 
in the lower court by the above-named Plaintiff against the 
above-named Defendants and another Defendant, to-wit: Dr. 
John M. Bender, Civil No. 241935, wherein substantially the 
same relief was sought as is sought in this action. Said 
action failed otherwise than upon the merits on the 13th day 
of January, 1978, when it was dismissed without prejudice pur-
suant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R. 3, 16, 27) 
On the 17th day of' January, 1978, an action was filed 
in the lower court by the above-named Plaintiff against the 
above-named Defendants, Civil No. C-78-297, wherein the 
same relief was sought as that which is sought in this 
action. A motion was filed by the Defendants to dismiss 
said action on the grounds that the claims set forth 
therein were barred by the pertinent statute of limita-
tions. Said motion was, on the 15th day of March, 1978, 
denied on the grounds that the Plaintiff filed that action 
within one year after the voluntary dismissal of Civil action 
No. 241935, as aforesaid, and said action was, therefore, 
-3-
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timely filed under the provisions of §78-12-40, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
said action on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to file a 
Notice of Intent to Commence Action pursuant to the provi-
sions of §78-14-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
was granted on the 15th day of March, 1978, without pre-
judice to Plaintiff's right to refile after complying with 
the requirements of said section. (R. 2, 3, 16, 27) 
On the 4th day of May, 1978, Notice of Intent to 
Commence Legal Action against the Defendants above named 
was served on the Defendants, The Health Services Corpora-
tion of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
and Intermountain Health Care, Inc., and on the 5th day 
of May, 1978, said Notice was served upon Dr. Peter S. 
Quintero, all pursuant to order of the court, as aforesaid, 
and §78-14-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended; none 
of the Defendants responded to said Notice. (R. 4, 16, 28) 
On Speternber 28, 1978, Plaintiff filed a third Com-
plaint, Civil No. C-78-6121, wherein the same relief was 
sought as that which was sought in the previous actions. 
(R. 1) Defendants, on November 20, 1978, filed Motions 
for Summary Judgment. (R. 24, 33) These Motions were 
argued before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft on November 30, 
1978. (R. 31, 34, 82) Relying primarily on the case of 
-4-
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Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978), the lower court 
granted the Defendants' Motions and entered Summary Judg-
ment and Judgment of Dismissal in favor of the Defendants 
on December 21, 1978. (R. 83, 86, 87) On January 2, 
1979, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Order Amending Judg-
ment of Dismissal and Summary Judgment (R. 90), which 
Motion was argued on January 16, 1979 (R. 96, 110) and 
denied by the lower court on Order entered January 25, 1979. 
(R. 110) 
On January 22, 1979, Plaintiff filed his Notice of 
Appeal. (R. 106) In March of 1979, the intention of the 
Utah State Legislature that §78-14-8 of the Health Care 
Act not be applied retroactively was confirmed by the adop-
tion of amendments to that section. 
Plaintiff-Appellant White was, at the time this 
cause of action accrued, mentally incompetent, and no legal 
guardian was appointed for him until the 28th day of Septem-
her, 1978, the date on which Dorene Zundel was appointed 
as guardian ad litem for the purpose of these proceedings. 
(R. 9, 13, 93, 94) 
POINT I 
THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF §78-14-8 IS TO BE 
APPLIED ONLY TO CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING 
AFTER APRIL 1, 1976. 
-5-
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A. THE RECENT AMENDMENTS TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT, ARE 
DETERl1INATIVE IN THE CASE AT BAR OF THE ISSUE 
OF NOTICE. 
In March of 1979, the Utah State Legislature passed 
House Bill 164, which bill was subsequently signed into law 
by Governor Matheson and became effective on the 8th day of 
May, 1979. This bill amends Utah Code Annotated §78-14-8, 
as follows: 
78-14-8. No malpractice action against a 
health care provider may be [ee!!lJTlefteea] initiated 
unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospec-
tive defendant or his executor or successor, at 
least ninety days' prior notice of intent to 
commence an action. Such notice shall include 
a general statement of the nature of the claim, 
the persons involved, the date, time and place 
of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, 
specific allegations of misconduct on the part 
of the prospective defendant, the nature of the 
alleged injuries and other damages sustained. 
Notice may be in letter or affidavit form 
executed by the plaintiff [afte] or his attorney. 
Service shall be accomplished by-Persons 
authorized and in the manner prescribed by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service 
of the summons and complaint in a civil action 
or by certified mail, return receipt requested, 
in which case notice shall be deemed to have 
been served on the date of mailing. Such 
notice shall be served within the time allowed 
for commencing a malpractice action against a 
health care provider. If the notice is served 
less than ninety days prior to the expiration 
of the applicable time period, the time for 
commencing the malpractice action against the 
health care provider shall be extended to 
[ft±fte~y] 120 days from the date of service of 
notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of deter-
mining its retroactivity, not be construed as 
relating to the limitation on the time for 
-6-
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coll\filencing any action, and shall apply only to 
causes of action arising on or after April 1, 
1976. This section shall not apply to third 
party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims 
against a health care provider. (The under-
lined portions were added, the bracketed 
portions deleted by the amendment.) 
The sub-issue at this point is whether the amendment 
to §78-14-8, is to be applied retroactively; is it to apply 
to cases pending on appeal? There are two avenues for 
argument under the facts of the present case but both lead 
to the same result. 
1. Is a new legislative enactment applicable to a 
pending appeal if it effects only matters of practice and 
procedure? The answer to this is clearly, yes. 
In the case of Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 
P.2d 589 (1948), this Court reversed a trial courts ruling 
because the Judge had used the jury's findings in a foreclosure 
action in an advisory capacity only. The case was remanded 
for rehearing as there was at that time no law allowing the 
jury to be used only in an advisory capacity in these type 
of actions. However, before the matter was reheard the 
legislature changed the law so as to allow the jury to be 
used in an advisory role in such actions. The lower court 
again used the jury's findings as merely being advisory and 
ruled for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed arguing 
that new law should not be applied to a pending case. In 
rejecting the defendant's argument and affirming the deci-
sion this Court cited Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165 
104 P. 117 (1909), which held: 
-7-
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"While it is true that a party's rights 
in a judgr:ient, as a general rule, may not 
be affected by legislative acts passed or 
which become effective after the entry of 
judgment, the rule does not apply to laws 
which are merely remedial, and which only 
effect matters of procedure and practice." 
This Court further stated on page 394 of the Petty 
case, in rejecting the defendant's contention that the 
appellate court was bound by its previous decisions (law of 
the case): 
But the law of the case doctrine does not 
apply to a case where the policy of the 
law has been changed in the meantime by 
a legislative enactment, in a case where 
the amended provision deals only with 
procedure rather than making a change in 
substantive law. 
In holding that pending actions will be governed by 
newly enacted statutory provisions dealing 1'1ith matters of 
procedure and practice, Utah joined with the majority of her 
sister states who have ruled on this point. 
In 111 A.L.R. at page 1334, it states: 
"Although in some cases involving questions 
of evidence and practice, a contrary con-
clusion has been reached ... it is quite 
generally assumed that the appellate court 
will determine questions of practice and 
evidence according to the law prevailing 
at the time of its decision on appeal, and 
not the time the judgment appealed from is 
rendered." (Citations omitted.) 
In the case of Denison v. Goforth, 454 P.2d 218, 
(Wash. 1969), the Washington Supreme Court reversed a sum-
mary judgment entered by a lower court dismissing a malpracti 
suit based upon a case which it (Washington Supreme Court) 
decided during the period after the Denison case had been 
argued but before the decision was handed down. The issue 
-8-
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dealt with the appropriate time from which the statute of 
limitations should run. Had the court decided Denison 
under the law v;hich existed at the time it was heard in the 
lower courts or even as of the time arguments were heard 
on appeal, it would have had to affirm the summary judgment. 
Instead it followed the most recent law available and reversed 
the summary judgment with leave for all parties to amend 
their pleadings and advance to trial. 
The pertinent question then becomes whether the amend-
ment as adopted by the legislature is procedural. Clearly 
it is. The entirety of §78-14-8 deals with the notice require-
ment, when and how it is to be given, and for what causes of 
action it applies. The notice requirement is a legislatively 
established pre-requisite to a party-plaintiff proceeding 
with his common law cause of action. It neither creates nor 
destroys a substantive nor a vested right. 
In §78-14-2 of the Act, the legislature states, 
• it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a 
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against 
health care providers ••• and to provide other procedural 
changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." 
(Emphasis added.) This Court also states in Vealey, supra, 
page 920, that limitation and notice requirements are pro-
cedural matters. 
No substantive rights are created, vested or severed 
by this amendment; it is purely procedural in nature. Thus, 
-9-
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it is applicable to the pending action. Therefore, neither 
is the notice requirement to be applied retroactively, nor 
are the provisions of §78-14-8 to be "construed as relating 
to the limitation on the time for commencing an action." 
2. May a new legislative enactn~nt or change in the 
law (not just those effecting only practice a~d procedure) 
be applied by the court to a pending appeal to aid it in 
the proper interpretation and application of existing law? 
Again, the answer clearly is, yes. As expressed in 
Okland Construction Company v. Industrial Commission, 520 
P.2d 208, (Utah 1974), 
"It is a widely accepted principle that where 
a statutory amend~ent deals only with clarifi-
cation and amplification as to how the law 
should have been understood prior to its 
enactment, such amendment and the correct 
interpretation should be given retroactive 
application." 
We are not in this case dealing with the situation 
where there is a change in the law interjected into the 
legal structure pending an action on appeal. Instead, we 
are clearly dealing with the situation where a statutory 
amendment clarifies and amplifies how the law should have 
been understood prior to its enactment. We are not dealing 
with retrospective application of an amendment extending 
the period of limitations as was the case in Ireland v. 
MacKintosh, 22 Utah 296, 61 P. 901 (1900), and Greenhalgh v. 
Payson City, 530 P.2d 799, (Utah 1975). 
-10-
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Neither are we dealing in this case with the situa-
tion where a final judgment has been entered. Had this 
Court already ruled on this particular case, it is concededly 
doubtful whether a subsequent change in the law or a clarifi-
cation of the law could effect it. (See Boucofski, supra.) 
But, here there is of yet no final judgment; the matter is 
pending. 
As the case at bar presents a situation where the 
amendments do not change existing law but merely clarify 
and correct errors made in its previous interpretation and 
application, and there is no prior entry of final judgment 
herein, the newly enacted amendments are applicable and 
determinative herein as to the issue of retroactivity of the 
notice requirement. Therefore, whether applying the amend-
ment directly or merely using it to get a proper interpre-
tation and application of §78-14-8, the result is the same. 
Said section is not to be applied to causes of action arising 
prior to April 1, 1976. Also, as per the amendment, neither 
can the provisions of §78-14-8 be construed as "relating 
to the limtation on time for commencing an action" as that 
phrase is used in §78-14-11. 
As Plaintiff-Appellant's cause of action arose in 
April of 1975, he was not obligated to give a Notice of 
Intent to Commence Suit. To hold otherwise would be directly 
contrary to the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. 
-11-
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B. EVEN IF THE AMENDMENT IS NOT FOUND TO BE 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE NOTICE ISSUE, THE 
INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE ORIGINALLY 
ADOPTED SECTION IS CLEAR. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §68-3-3, provides, "No 
part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly 
so declared." (See also McCarrey v. Utah Teachers Retirement 
Board, 111 Utah 251, 177 P.2d 725, (1947); Shupe v. Wasatch 
Electric Company, 546 P.2d 896, (Utah 1976).) 73 Arn. Jur. 
2d, STATUTES, §350, p. 487, states: 
The question whether a statute operates retro-
spectively or prospectively only, is one of 
legislative intent. In determining such intent, 
courts observe a strict rule of construction 
against retrospective operation, and indulge 
in the presumption that the legislature intended 
statutes, or amendments thereof enacted by it, 
to operate prospectively only, and not retro-
actively. However, a contrary determination 
will be made where the intention of the legis-
lature to make the statute retroactive is stated 
in express terms, or is clearly, explicitly, 
positively, unequivocally, unmistakably and 
unambiguously shown by necessary implication or 
by terms which permit no other meaning to be 
annexed to them, and which preclude all question 
in regard thereto, and leave no reasonable doubt 
thereof. (Emphasis added.) 
By its express terms, the only section of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act, as originally adopted, to be 
applied retroactively is §78-14-4. This is clear by the terms 
of §78-14-4(2), "The provisions of this section . shall 
apply retroactively . Also, by the terms of §78-14-11: 
Act not retroactive - Exception - The provisions 
of this Act, with the exception of the provisions 
relating to the limitation on the time for com-
mencing an action, shall not apply to injuries, 
death or services rendered which occurred prior 
to the effective date of this Act [April 1, 1976). 
-12-
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Respondents and others in similar positions have 
argued that §78-14-8, which sets forth the requirement of 
serving a Notice of Intent to Commence Action, is a provision 
"relating to the limitation on the time for commencing 
action," and, thus, should be applied retroactively pursuant 
to §78-14-11, above quoted. This is an erroneous construc-
tion of the statute and an improper application of the exist-
ing law as is clear from an application of the rules of con-
struction as discussed below and from the amendment to 
§78-14-8. 
In determining whether an enactment is to be applied 
retroactively, the legislative intent is paramount. There 
exists a "strict rule of construction against retrospective 
operation." The legislature overcomes the rule of construc-
tion only by a "clearly, e~plicitly, positively, unequivocally, 
unmistakably, and unambiguously" shown intention. This may 
be by implication, but the terms of the statute must "permit 
no other meaning . and preclude all question in 
regard thereto and leave no reasonable doubt" as to the 
intent. 73 Am. Jur. 2d, STATUTES, supra. 
The Utah legislature was apparently very conscious 
of these limits on the retroactivity of newly passed statutes, 
It went to the effort of setting forth in §78-14-4 that: 
"The provisions of this section . • • shall apply retro-
actively • • " (Emphasis added.) No other section of this 
Act contains such a statement except §78...J.4-llr whtch.. 
-13-
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expressly refers to those "provisions relating to the limita-
tion on the time for commencing an action." (Emphasis added.) 
Had the legislature intended any other section of this Act 
to be applied retroactively, it could and undoubtedly would 
have made this intent as clear in the other section(s) as 
it did in §78-14-4. Also, the legislature used the word 
"provisions" both in §78-14-4 and §78-14-11 with respect 
to the "provisions" which were to be given retroactive effect. 
Although it is not conclusive that "provisions" in §78-14-11 
refers to the same "provisions" referred to in §78-14-4, it 
is some indication of the legislature's intent. 
Thus, by straight forward application of the rule of 
construction against retroactivity, the presumption that 
statutes are to apply only prospectively and the fact that 
there is no clear, unmistakable or unambiguous intent shown 
that §78-14-8 be applied other than prospectively, it cannot 
be construed to be retroactively applicable. Furthermore, 
to be applied retroactively, the statute must by its terms 
"permit no other meaning;" it must leave "no reasonable 
doubt" as to the intent of the legislature. Obviously, this 
statute does "permit meanings" other than that it be retro-
actively applied. In fact, its most plain and logical mean-
ing is that it is for prospective application only. So in 
the very least, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether 
§78-14-8 is to be applied retroactively. This, coupled with 
the above discussion, especially the rule of strict construc-
tion against retroactivity, is sufficient to defeat any claim 
-14-
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Respondents may have with regard to the retroactive applic-
ability of the §78-14-8. 
C. VEALEY V. CLEGG, SHOULD BE OVERRULED 
OR CLARIFIED. 
Some have interpreted the Vealey case as meaning that 
§78-14-8 is to be applied retroactively, to actions occurring 
prior to April 1, 1976. The language of the opinion is, 
however, unclear and ambiguous. Based upon the preceding 
discussion, it is clear that the Court erred if it intended 
the rectroactive application of the notice section. Further, 
Plaintiff-Appellant herein agrees with and endorses the 
arguments and discussions in plaintiff-appellant Cleghorn's 
brief in the sister case, No. 16329, which has been consoli-
dated with the case herein for purposes of this appeal. 
To avoid repetition, Plaintiff-Appellant White herein 
will not recite the arguments presented by Cleghorn in his 
brief in this regard. Instead, the Court is referred to 
pages 9 through 13 of said brief. Suffice it here to say 
that it appears the Court, in all due respect, misconstrued 
the phrase "expiration of the applicable time period" as 
used in §78-14-8. (See Vealey, supra. p. 920.) If the Court 
did not interpret this phrase to mean the "effective date" 
of the statute, i.e., April 1, 1976, the opinion is ambiguous 
and needs to be clarified. If the Court did interpret the 
above phrase to mean and be limited to the "effective date" 
of the statute, such interpretation is clearly erroneous and 
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must be reversed. (See also appellant McGuire's brief in 
Case No. 151984, also consolidated herewith for hearing, 
pages 6 through 13.) 
Plaintiff-Appellant White, at this point, would only 
remind the Court as to that which Chief Justice Crockett 
so cogently states in State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100, (Utah 
1977): 
states: 
As a general proposition, the law as established 
should remain so until changed by the legisla-
ture, whose prerogative it is to make and to change 
the law. This does not mean to say that where 
there is judgment-made law, which is later 
observed to be clearly in error, that such error 
should be so cast in cement that it cannot be 
remedied. In such circumstances, the court 
undoubtedly can and should correct it. (Id. at 
1102) 
POINT II 
§78-14-8 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 
I §24 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation 
This provision is, in effect, Utah's guarantee to equal 
protection under the law, paralleling Amendment XIV of the 
United States Constitution. This Court has consistently 
held that an act is unconstitutional if it, without "reason-
able basis," treats one group of persons differently from 
another group similarly situated. Leetham v. McGinn, 524 
-16-
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P.2d 323, (Utah 1974); Hansen v. Public Employee's Retire-
ment System Board of Administration, 122 Utah 44, 246 P.2d 
591 (1952); Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 
464 (1948). 
The U. S. Supreme Court likewise adopts a "rational 
basis" test in cases dealing with alleged violations of the 
guarantee of equal protection, except those dealing with fun-
damental rights or suspect classes (primarily First Amendment 
rights) in which cases it applies a compelling state interest 
test. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426, 81 S. Ct. 
1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1961). 
Is there a rational basis to distinguish between plain-
tiffs in medical malpractice cases and plaintiffs in other 
personal injury cases, and particularly from plaintiffs in 
other professional malpractice actions? Why should a plain-
tiff in a medical malpractice case be required to file a 
Notice of Intent to Commence Action when other similarly 
situated plaintiffs are not required to so do? 
Although no exact statistical study has been done, 
the Court should take judicial notice that legal actions, 
particularly personal injury and all professional malpractice 
actions, have increased significantly over the past decade. 
This applies both as to the number of suits filed and the 
amount of damages sought and recovered. The public has grown 
litigation conscious. Individuals want recovery for every 
alleged wrong or injury inflicted on them. The courts have 
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become the avenue for them to obtain their recoveries. 
The Utah legislature set forth the purpose of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act in §78-14-2: 
Legislative findings and declarations--Purpose 
of act. The legislature finds and declares that 
the number of suits and claims for damages and 
the amount of judgments and settlements arising 
from health care has increased greatly in recent 
years. Because of these increases the insurance 
industry has substantially increased the cost of 
medical malpractice insurance. The effect of 
increased premiurr.s and increased claims is 
increased care cost, both through the health 
care providers passing the cost of premiums to 
the patient and through the provider's practicing 
defensive medicine because he views a patient as 
a potential adversary in a lawsuit. Further, 
certain health care providers are discouraged 
from continuing to provide services because of 
the high cost and possible unavailability of 
malpractice insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the inten-
tion of alleviating the adverse effects which 
these trends are producing in the public's health 
care system, it is necessary to protect the public 
interest by enacting measures designed to encourage 
private insurance companies to continue to provide 
health-related malpractice insurance while at the 
same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the 
availability of insurance in the event that it 
becomes unavailable from private companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the 
legislature to provide a reasonable time in which 
actions may be commenced against health care pro-
viders while limiting that time to a specific 
period for which professional liability insurance 
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calcu-
lated; and to provide other procedural changes 
to expedite early evaluation and settlement of 
claims. 
The legislature finds that there is an increase in 
the number of suits and claims for damages and in the amount 
of judgments and settlements. As a result, insurance 
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premiums have increased, which costs have been passed on to 
the public. It finds that this has resulted in "providers 
[of health care] practicing defensive medicine," and that 
"providers are discouraged from continuing to provide 
services because of the high cost and possible unavailability 
of malpractice insurance." 
Plaintiff-Appellant contends that this is no different 
from other professions supplying services to the public. 
Any attorney who has recently looked at the increased pre-
miums he or she must pay for legal malpractice insurance faces 
the same situation as the health care providers. Insurance 
premiums have substantially increased in cost, and they, 
like the cost in the medical profession, are passed on to the 
public. These costs are also so significantly high as to 
cause some attorneys to "go bare" and discourage others from 
continuing to provide legal services. 
Likewise, attorneys and other professionals also must 
practice "defensively" just as drivers of vehicles must practice 
"defensive driving." There is no burden in this but rather an 
implied duty to do so. Health care providers should not be 
exempt from this duty of practicing defensively, nor is such 
a duty unique to them. Health care providers are simply in 
no different position than other providers of professional 
services. 
There exists, therefore, no rational basis for distin-
guishing between plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions 
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and plaintiffs in other professional malpractice actions. 
It cannot realistically be argued that plaintiffs in medical 
malpractice actions are more frivolous and less reasonable 
than plaintiffs in other professional malpractice actions. 
In addition to there being required a "reasonable 
basis" for a differentiation to be constitutional, the 
"reasonable basis" must be related to the purposes to be 
accomplished by the act. Abrahamsen v. Bd. of Review of 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 3 Utah 2d 289, 283 P.2d 213 
(1955); Leetham, supra.; Hansen, supra. Chief Justice 
Berger states that " ... the Equal Protection Clause does 
enable us to strike down discriminatory law • . . where 
the classification is justified by no legitimate state 
interest, compelling or otherwise." Weber v. Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1406, 31 L.Ed 2d 768 
(1972). The purposes (i.e., the state interest) sought to 
be accomplished by this act are set forth in the third para-
graph of §78-14-2 as quoted above. This in effect pre-supposes 
that the present notice requirement will reduce the number 
and amounts sought in medical malpractice cases. Were this 
true, and there is absolutely no indication that it is, why 
not require such notice in all other cases? 
There does not appear by statistic or logic any indica-
tion that the 90-day notice period will expedite early 
-20-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evaluation and settlement of claims. If anything, the oppo-
site is true. The notice requirement gives the provider an 
additional 90 days to sit on the claim and, if he is of the 
nature to do so, destroy or otherwise make unavailable 
records which may be critical to the case. Also, the pro-
vider may hide his assets or leave the jurisdiction, thus 
jeopardizing the plaintiff's position. A suit filed with 
the court would also be more motivation for a provider to 
promptly evaluate and settle a claim and would protect the 
just causes of action of the injured plaintiff. 
Defendant-Appellants have argued that other courts 
have upheld pre-suit procedural requirements. This is true, 
but most, if not all, of these deal with some type of manda-
tory arbitration and/or pre-submission of claims to a medical 
panel. Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977); 
State v. Ex. Rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W. 2d 442 
(Wisc. 1978). And even these statutes providing for arbitra-
tion are not upheld by all courts. As stated in Graley v. 
Satayatham, 343 N.E. 2d at 837 (Ohio 1972), speaking of 
special requirements for medical malpractice actions: 
There is no satisfactory reason for this separate 
and unequal treatment. There obviously is 'no 
compelling governmental interst' unless it be 
argued that any segment of the public in financial 
distress be at least partly relieved of financial 
accountability for its negligence. To articulate 
the requirement is to demonstrate its absurdity, 
for at one time or another every type of profes-
sion or business undergoes difficult times, and 
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it is not the business of government to manipu-
late the law so as to provide succor to one 
class, the medical, by depriving another, the 
malpracticed patients, of the equal protection 
mandated by the constitution. Even remaining 
within the area of the professions, it is 
notable that the special consideration given 
to the medical profession by these statutes 
is not given to lawyers or dentists or others 
who are subject to malpractice suits. 
Additionally, assuming a valid legislative 
purpose to enact laws relating to protection 
of the public's health, this legislation may 
be counter-productive. The extending of special 
litigation benefits to the medical profession 
certainly cannot be considered as relating to 
protection of the public health. On the con-
trary, the quality of health care may actually 
decline. To the extent that in tort actions of 
the malpractice type if the medical profession 
is less accountable than formerly, relaxation 
of medical standards may occur with the public 
the victim. 
Courts, of course, may not invalidate legisla-
tion merely because it is preceived as unwise. 
Here there is a transgression of a basic con-
stitutional principle forbidding unequal and 
special treatment for a class with no general 
beneficient reason apparent. (Emphasis added.) 
(See also Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E. 2d 
903 (Ohio 1976), where the above language was adopted and the 
compulsory arbitration requirement held violative of equal 
protection guarantees.) 
Even where such arbitration/pre-submission requirements 
are upheld, it is clear that such are different from a pre-
suit notice requirement which bears no relation to the purpose 
of expediting evaluation and settlement of claims. The 
notice requirement is at best a procedural burden to plain-
tiffs and an automatic extension of time to the providers-
defendants. 
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Section 78-14-8, therefore, is unconstitutional as 
it is arbitrary and without rational basis in differentiating 
between plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions and plain-
tiffs in other types of professional malpractice and personal 
injury actions; also, it is not reasonably related to the 
purpose of the act as such is set forth by the legislature. 
Therefore, "[T]here is no fair reason for the law," 
(Gronlund, supra.), and this Court should strike it down. 
Like in Gronlund, supra., where the court found Sunday closing 
ordinances constitutional but found that the classification of 
what commodities could be sold on Sunday was arbitrary and 
unconstitutional, the Court may here find that a pre-suit 
notice requirement is constitutional but not where it applies 
to groups of plaintiffs not rationally nor reasonably distin-
guishable from another group of plaintiffs. 
POINT III 
§78-14-8 VIOLATES ARTICLE VI, §26 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH. 
Article VI, §26 of the Constitution of Utah states: 
No private or special law shall be enacted where 
a general law can be applicable. 
In the case of Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. 
Utah Insurance Guaranty Association, 564 P.2d 75 (Utah 1977), 
this Court defined "special laws" and "general laws" as 
follows: 
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A general law applies to and operates uniformly 
upon all members of any class of persons, places, 
or things requiring legislation peculair to them-
selves in the matters covered by the laws in 
question. On the other hand, special legislation 
relates either to particular persons, places or 
things or to persons, places or things which, 
though not particularized, are separated by any 
method of selection from the whole class to 
which the law might, but for such legislation, 
be applied. 
In People v. Western Fruit Growers, [140 P.2d 13 
(Cal. 1943)], the court stated a law is general 
when it applies equally to all persons embraced 
in a class founded upon some natural, intrinsic 
or constitutional distinction. It is special 
legislation if it ... imposes peculair disabili-
ties, or burdensome conditions in the exercise of 
a common right; upon a class of persons arbitrarily 
selected, from the general body of those who stand 
in precisely the same relation to the subject of 
the law. (Emphasis added.) 
The notice requirement of §78-14-8 is a procedural 
burden, a peculair disability, imposed upon plaintiffs in 
medical malpractice actions. As discussed in Point II 
above, these plaintiffs constitute a class of plaintiffs 
arbitrarily selected from the general body of professional 
malpractice and personal injury plaintiffs. All such plain-
tiffs stand in"precisely the same relation to the subject of 
the law," the "subject of the law" being particularly pro-
fessional malpractice actions. The notice statute is, there 
fore, violative of Article VI §26 of the Constitution of Uta 
POINT IV 
THIS ACTION WAS TIMELY FILED PURSUANT TO THE 
TERMS OF §78-12-40, UTAH CODE AHNOTATED, 1953, 
AS AMENDED. 
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The straightforward application of §78-12-40, the 
Utah Saving Statute, results in Plaintiff-Appellant's action 
being timely filed whether or not the notice requirement is 
applicable hereto. 
Section 78-12-40, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
provides: 
If any action is commenced within due time and 
a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, 
or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon 
a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, 
and the time limited either by law or contract 
for coI!U'!\encing the same shall have expired, the 
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action 
survives, his representatives, may commence a 
new action within one year after the reversal 
or failure. 
This provides for a one-year grace period to re-commence 
an action if: (1) there has been an original action commenced 
within the period of the applicable statute of limitations; 
(2) the original action is dismissed or fails otherwise than 
on its merits; and (3) the original statute of limitations 
period has expired since the commencing of the original action. 
Section 78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
provides in relevant part: 
No malpractice action against a health care pro-
vider may be brought unless it is commenced 
within two years after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the injury, 
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four 
years after the date of the alleged act, omis-
sion, neglect or occurrence 
Plaintiff-Appellant entered the McKay-Dee Hospital 
on or about April 15, 1975. On or about April 18, 1975, 
and thereafter, Plaintiff sustained injuries and damage 
which were proximately caused by the negligent acts and omis-
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sions of Defendants-Respondents. (R. 3-5, 16, 28, 29) Plain-
tiff, pursuant to the statute set forth above, had two years 
to commence an action. As he filed suit on April 18, 1977 
(R.3, 16, 27), within the two-year limitation period, his 
Complaint was timely. 
Respondents will argue that as suit was filed after 
the effective date (April 1, 1976) of the Health Care Mal-
practice Act, that he (Plaintiff) was subject to the notice 
requirement contained in §78-14-8 of said act and could not 
"commence" an action until he complied with the notice provi-
sion. This has been thoroughly discussed in the preceding 
portion of this brief. Suffice it to say here that it is 
Plaintiff-Appellant's position that the notice requirement 
is not applicable. However, even if it is held to be applic-
able, Plaintiff's action was timely "com.'1\enced." 
The only Utah authority setting forth how an action 
may be commenced is Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. In relevant part it provides: 
A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a 
complaint with the court, or (2) by the service 
of a summons. 
As Plaintiff filed a Complaint, he did commence an action. 
If the notice requirement was applicable, which Plaintiff 
submits it was not, it does not effect the fact that the 
action had been commenced. The action, however, may have 
been subject to an order of dismissal or an order staying 
prosecution. 
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In any event, on April 18, 1977, Plaintiff's action 
was corrunenced within due time. However, on January 15, 
1978, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed this action pursuant to 
Rule 41(a) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 3, 
16, 27) 
This rule provides in pertinent part that an action may 
be voluntarily dismissed by a Plaintiff without order of the 
court "by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before 
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for 
surrunary judgment • . • Unless otherwise stated in the notice 
... the dismissal is without prejudice •. Because 
nothing had been served upon the Defendants, and none of them 
had filed an answer or motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff's 
Notice of Dismissal acted to dismiss his action without pre-
judice. (R. 3, 16, 26, 27) 
There is, therefore, n~ question but that Plaintiff's 
original action was timely commenced. In addition, Utah case 
law has expressly held that a voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff 
without prejudice is a failure of action "otherwise than upon 
the merits." Luke v. Bennion, 36 Utah 61, 106 P. 712 U908); 
Jones v. Jenkins, 22 F.2d 642 (1927). Therefore, there is 
also no question that Plaintiff's original action was dismissed 
without prejudice for reasons other than on its merits. 
Thirdly, for purposes of this portion of the argument, it will 
be assumed that the original statute of limitations period had 
expired. Therefore, pursuant to §78-12-40 as set forth above, 
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Plaintiff had one year from the date of dismissal, i.e., 
until January 14, 1979, to re-commence his action. As this 
was done on January 17, 1978, when he re-filed, he was again 
time 1 y . ( R . 2 , 3 , 16 , 2 7 ) 
However, this second action, in March, 1978, was 
erroneously dismissed "otherwise than upon the merits" when 
the lower court, following its interpretation of this Court's 
decision in Vealey, dismissed the action without prejudice 
to allow Plaintiff to give notice of intent to commence action 
pursuant to §78-14-8. (R. 2, 3, 16, 27) Plaintiff did give 
notice pursuant to said statute and re-commenced his action 
on September 28, 1978. (R. 1, 4, 6, 28) It is upon this 
third action that the present appeal is based. 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on this third 
action were granted, the lower court having found that the 
claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations. (R. 83, 86, 87) 
As set forth in the preceding discussion, this finding was 
clearly in error as the action was timely by application of 
78-12-40. This is true even if the Court holds that the noti~ 
requirement is applicable herein, as Plaintiff did fully comply 
therewith prior to commencing this action. (R. 4, 16, 28) 
It should be noted that there is authority for holding 
as the Oregon court did in White v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 
123 P.2d 193 (Ore. 1942), that the Oregon statute paralleling 
U.C.A. §78-12-40 "applied only to the same cause of action 
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. . . for if the cause of action is a different cause of 
action than that sued on in the former action, ••• the 
bringing of said action would be expressly barred by statute." 
In addition, 51 Arn. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, 
p. 820, §318 states: 
As a general rule, a statute permitting commence-
ment of a new action within a specified time 
after failure of a prior action other than on 
the merits is not applicable where the parties 
in the new action are not the same as the ones 
in the prior action. Thus, where an enabling 
act permits a subsequent action after the limita-
tion period where the first suit has failed, the 
second suit must be substantially the same cause 
of action and must be prosecuted by the same 
plaintiff or his legal representatives against 
all the defendants who were necessary parties 
to the first suit or their legal representatives. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In this case, the only real difference in the original 
and subsequent complaints filed by the Plaintiff is that Dr. 
John Bender is named as a Defendant in the first Complaint 
and is not named in either of the subsequent Complaints. 
Otherwise, the Complaints deal with the same cause of action, 
the same Plaintiff or his legal representative, and the subse-
quent actions are against all "defendants who were necessary 
parties to the first suit." 
In any event, no allegation has been made and no 
defense raised by any of the Defendant-Respondents herein 
where it is alleged that Dr. John Bender was a necessary party 
to the first suit. Furthermore, whether Dr. Bender was a 
necessary party is a question of fact which, if properly 
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raised by the Defendants, must be decided by a trial court--
finder of fact. 
Therefore, the Utah Saving Statute, U.C.A. §78-12-40, 
is applicable here to establish that Plaintiff's action upon 
which this appeal is based was timely filed. 
POINT V 
IF THERE Wl\S AN UNELAPSED PORTION OF THE LIMITA-
TIONS PERIOD AS OF APRIL 1, 1976 FOR MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS ARISING PRIOR TO THAT DATE, 
THE LAW REGARDING TP.E PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS THAT 
EXISTED PRIOR TO SAID DATE WOULD BE CONTROLLING 
BUT NOT TO EXTEND THE PERIOD BEYOHD MARCH 30, 
1980. 
Even if the notice requirement of §78-14-8 is construed 
to be applied retroactively, Plaintiff's Complaint of Septem-
ber 28, 1978 would still have been timely. 
The Health Care Malpractice Act provides in §78-14-4(2): 
The provisions of this section shall apply to 
all persons regardless of minority or other 
legal disability (under §78-12-36 or any other 
provision of the law) and shall apply retro-
actively to all persons, partnerships, associa-
tions and corporations and to all health care 
providers and to all malpractice actions against 
health care providers based upon alleged per-
sonal injuries which occurred prior to the 
effective date of this act; provided, however, 
that any action which under former law could 
have been commenced after the effective date 
of this act may be commenced only within the 
unelapsed portion of the time allowed under 
former law; but any action which under former law 
could have been commenced more than four years 
after the effective date of this act may be com-
menced only within four years after the effective 
date of this act. (Emphasis added; also, the 
portions in parenthesis were added by the 1979 
amendment.) 
-30-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The above clearly and unequivocally provides that the 
provisions of §78-14-4 regarding the Statute of Limitations 
are to apply regardless of legal disability, and that the 
time limitations are to be applied retroactively. It does 
not state, however, that the provisions in that section are 
to be applied retroactively to effect those with legal dis-
abilities predating the act's effective date. The applica-
bility of this section to those with legal disabilities and 
the retroactivity of the time limits set forth in the section 
are not necessarily related. A careful analysis of the word-
ing of the section shows that just the opposite is true. 
The clause (underlined above) following the first 
semicolon of the above quoted provision is an express limita-
tion on the preceding clause. That this provision is to 
apply regardless of legal disability and is to be applied 
retroactively is set forth but is then limited by "provided, 
however . . " that for actions not barred by the Statute of 
Limitations on or before April 1, 1976, an "action which 
under former law could have been commenced after the effective 
date of this act," the period of limitation under former law 
would be controlling. This only, however, to the extent 
there exists an unelapsed portion of time as measured by the 
Statute of Limitations applicable prior to April 1, 1976. 
This is further limited by the concluding clause to the 
effect that the unelapsed portion of the limitations period 
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under the former law would be controlling but not to extend 
beyond four years from the effective date of the act. 
Under former law, there was no provision abnegating 
the applicability of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, §78-12-36, 
as amended, to malpractice actions. Said section provides 
in pertinent part: 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other 
than for the recovery of real property, is at 
the time the cause of action accrued, either: 
(2) Mentally incorapetent and without a 
legal guardian; or .•. the time of such 
disability is not a part of the time limited 
for the commencement of the action. 
Since Plaintiff-Appellant was mentally incompetent 
at the time his cause of action accrued, which was before 
the effective date of the Health Care Act, and has continued 
under this disability ever since said time (~. 9-13, 93, 94); 
and since under former law a disability effectively tolled 
the running of the Statute of Liraitations even in malpractice 
actions, no part of the time that passed from the date his 
cause of action accrued until the effective date of the act 
is a "part of the time limited for the commencement of the 
action." 
That is, as of April 1, 1976, no time had run against 
Plaintiff-Appellant on the applicable Statute of Limitations 
as the statute had been effectively tolled by his disability. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, by the terms of the last clause of 
§78-14-4(2), had until March 30, 1980, four years from the 
effective date of the act, to commence his action. This 
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being true, this cause of action which was commenced on 
September 28, 1978, was timely filed. (R. 2) This is true 
even if the Court rejects all of Plaintiff-Appellant's argu-
ments against the retroactive application of the notice pro-
vision, as he fully and timely complied therewith before 
commencing this action. (R. 4, 16, 28) 
CONCLUSION 
The 1979 Amendments to the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act are determinative of the issue of the retroactivity of 
the notice requirement of §78-14-8. As shown by these amend-
ments and by careful analysis of the original statute, it is 
clear that the legislature's intent was and is that this 
section not be applied retroactively. Vealey, supra. should 
be overruled or clarified to conform herewith. 
Even if this were not true, §78-14-8 violates the equal 
protection clause of the United States Constitution and 
Article I §24 and Article VI §26 of the Constitution of Utah. 
It is, therefore, void and unenforceable. 
Finally, pursuant to the application of §78-12-40, the 
Utah Saving Statute, Plaintiff's action of September 28, 1978 
was timely. However, even if the Court were to reject appli-
cation of the saving statute, Plaintiff's September 28, 1978 
action was timely pursuant to the terms of §78-14-4(2) and 
the fact that Plaintiff has suffered a legal disability from 
the time his cause of action arose, which was before the 
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effective date of the act. In addition, were the Court to 
reject all of Plaintiff-Appellant's arguments with respect 
to the retroactivity or unconstitutionality of §78-14-8, 
such notice requirement was complied with by Plaintiff prior 
to filing his action on September 28, 1978. 
This action, therefore, should be remanded for trial 
on its merits. 
DATED this 
(_ 
/K_day of May, 1979. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
A. Hurst 
RS EN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
A~ rneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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